A case for weakening the Church-Turing Thesis by Anand, Bhupinder Singh
ar
X
iv
:1
10
8.
45
97
v1
  [
ma
th.
GM
]  
20
 A
ug
 20
11
A case for weakening the Church-Turing Thesis
Bhupinder Singh Anand
Draft of November 21, 2018.∗
Abstract
We conclude from Go¨del’s Theorem VII of his seminal 1931 paper that
every recursive function f(x1, x2) is representable in the first-order Peano
Arithmetic PA by a formula [F (x1, x2, x3)] which is algorithmically verifi-
able, but not algorithmically computable, if we assume that the negation
of a universally quantified formula of the first-order predicate calculus is
always indicative of the existence of a counter-example under the stan-
dard interpretation of PA. We conclude that the standard postulation of
the Church-Turing Thesis does not hold if we define a number-theoretic
formula as effectively computable if, and only if, it is algorithmically ver-
ifiable; and needs to be replaced by a weaker postulation of the Thesis as
an equivalence.
Keywords Algorithmic computability, algorithmic verifiability, Aristotle’s particu-
larisation, Church-Turing Thesis, effective computability, first-order, Go¨del β-function,
Peano Arithmetic PA, standard interpretation, Tarski, uniform method.
1 Introduction
We begin by noting that the following theses are classically equivalent1:
Standard Church’s Thesis2 A number-theoretic function (or relation,
treated as a Boolean function) is effectively computable if, and only if, it is
partial-recursive3.
Standard Turing’s Thesis4 A number-theoretic function (or relation,
treated as a Boolean function) is effectively computable if, and only if, it is
Turing-computable5.
In this paper we shall argue that the principle of Occam’s razor suggests the
Theses should be postulated minimally as the following equivalences:
∗Subject class: LO; MSC: 03B10
1cf. [Me64], p.237.
2Church’s (original) Thesis The effectively computable number-theoretic functions are the
algorithmically computable number-theoretic functions [Ch36].
3cf. [Me64], p.227.
4After describing what he meant by “computable” numbers in the opening sentence of his
1936 paper on Computable Numbers [Tu36], Turing immediately expressed this thesis—albeit
informally—as: “. . . the computable numbers include all numbers which could naturally be
regarded as computable”.
5cf. [BBJ03], p.33.
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Weak Church’s Thesis A number-theoretic function (or relation, treated
as a Boolean function) is effectively computable if, and only if, it is instan-
tiationally equivalent to a partial-recursive function (or relation, treated as a
Boolean function).
Weak Turing’s ThesisA number-theoretic function (or relation, treated as
a Boolean function) is effectively computable if, and only if, it is instantiationally
equivalent to a Turing-computable function (or relation, treated as a Boolean
function).
1.1 The need for explicitly distinguishing between ‘instan-
tiational’ and ‘uniform’ methods
It is significant that both Kurt Go¨del (initially) and Alonzo Church (subseque-
ntly—possibly under the influence of Go¨del’s disquietitude) enunciated Church’s
formulation of ‘effective computability’ as a Thesis because Go¨del was instinc-
tively uncomfortable with accepting it as a definition that minimally captures
the essence of ‘intuitive effective computability’6.
Go¨del’s reservations seem vindicated if we accept that a number-theoretic
function can be effectively computable instantiationally (in the sense of being
algorithmically verifiable as defined in Section 5 below), but not by a uniform
method (in the sense of being algorithmically computable as defined in Section
5).
The significance of the fact (considered below in Section 6) that ‘truth’ too
can be effectively decidable both instantiationally and by a uniform (algorithmic)
method under the standard interpretation of PA is reflected in Go¨del’s famous
1951 Gibbs lecture7, where he remarks:
“I wish to point out that one may conjecture the truth of a univer-
sal proposition (for example, that I shall be able to verify a certain
property for any integer given to me) and at the same time conjec-
ture that no general proof for this fact exists. It is easy to imag-
ine situations in which both these conjectures would be very well
founded. For the first half of it, this would, for example, be the case
if the proposition in question were some equation F (n) = G(n) of
two number-theoretical functions which could be verified up to very
great numbers n.”8
Such a possibility is also implicit in Turing’s remarks9:
“The computable numbers do not include all (in the ordinary sense)
definable numbers. Let P be a sequence whose n-th figure is 1 or
0 according as n is or is not satisfactory. It is an immediate conse-
quence of the theorem of §8 that P is not computable. It is (so far as
we know at present) possible that any assigned number of figures of
P can be calculated, but not by a uniform process. When sufficiently
6See [Si97].
7[Go51].
8Parikh’s paper [Pa71] can also be viewed as an attempt to investigate the consequences
of expressing the essence of Go¨del’s remarks formally.
9[Tu36], §9(II), p.139.
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many figures of P have been calculated, an essentially new method
is necessary in order to obtain more figures.”
The need for placing such a distinction on a formal basis has also been
expressed explicitly on occasion10. Thus, Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey11 define
a diagonal function, d, any value of which can be decided effectively, although
there is no single algorithm that can effectively compute d.
Now, the straightforward way of expressing this phenomenon should be to
say that there are well-defined number-theoretic functions that are effectively
computable instantiationally but not algorithmically. Yet, following Church and
Turing, such functions are labeled as uncomputable12!
“According to Turing’s Thesis, since d is not Turing-computable, d
cannot be effectively computable. Why not? After all, although no
Turing machine computes the function d, we were able to compute at
least its first few values, For since, as we have noted, f1 = f1 = f1 =
the empty function we have d(1) = d(2) = d(3) = 1. And it may
seem that we can actually compute d(n) for any positive integer
n—if we don’t run out of time.”13
The reluctance to treat a function such as d(n)—or the function Ω(n) that
computes the nth digit in the decimal expression of a Chaitin constant Ω14—as
computable, on the grounds that the ‘time’ needed to compute it increases mono-
tonically with n, is curious15; the same applies to any total Turing-computable
function f(n)16!
1.2 Distinguishing between algorithmically verifiability and
algorithmic computability
We now show in Theorem 1 that if Aristotle’s particularisation17 is presumed
valid over the structure N of the natural numbers—as is the case under the stan-
dard interpretation of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA—then it follows from
the instantiational nature of the (constructively defined18) Go¨del β-function that
a primitive recursive relation can be instantiationally equivalent to an arithmeti-
cal relation, where the former is algorithmically computable over N, whilst the
latter is algorithmically verifiable but not algorithmically computable over N.
10Parikh’s distinction between ‘decidability’ and ‘feasibility’ in [Pa71] also appears to echo
the need for such a distinction.
11[BBJ03], p. 37.
12The issue here seems to be that, when using language to express the abstract objects of
our individual, and common, mental ‘concept spaces’, we use the word ‘exists’ loosely in three
senses, without making explicit distinctions between them (see [An07c]).
13[BBJ03], p.37.
14Chaitin’s Halting Probability is given by 0 < Ω =
∑
2−|p| < 1, where the summation is
over all self-delimiting programs p that halt, and |p| is the size in bits of the halting program
p; see [Ct75].
15The incongruity of this is addressed by Parikh in [Pa71].
16The only difference being that, in the latter case, we know there is a common ‘program’
of constant length that will compute f(n) for any given natural number n; in the former, we
know we may need distinctly different programs for computing f(n) for different values of n,
where the length of the program will, sometime, reference n.
17See Definition 1 below.
18By Kurt Go¨del; see Appendix A, Section 7, Lemma 1
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Analagous distinctions in analysis: The distinction between algorithmically
computable, and algorithmically verifiable but not algorithmically computable,
number-theoretic functions seeks to reflect in arithmetic the essence of uniform
methods19, classically characterised by the distinctions in analysis between: (a)
uniformly continuous, and point-wise continuous but not uniformly continuous,
functions over an interval; (b) uniformly convergent, and point-wise convergent
but not uniformly convergent, series.
A limitation of set theory and a possible barrier to computation: We
note, further, that the above distinction cannot be reflected within a language—
such as the set theory ZF—which identifies ‘equality’ with ‘equivalence’. Since
functions are defined extensionally as mappings, such a language cannot recog-
nise that a set which represents a primitive recursive function may be equivalent
to, but computationally different from, a set that represents an arithmetical
function; where the former function is algorithmically computable over N, whilst
the latter is algorithmically verifiable but not algorithmically computable over
N.
1.2.1 Significance of Go¨del’s β-function
In Theorem VII 20 of his seminal 1931 paper on formally undecidable arithmeti-
cal propositions, Go¨del showed that, given a total number-theoretic function
f(x) and any natural number n, we can construct a primitive recursive func-
tion β(z, y, x) and natural numbers bn, cn such that β(bn, cn, i) = f(i) for all
0 ≤ i ≤ n.
In this paper we shall essentially answer the following question affirmatively:
Query 1 Does Go¨del’s Theorem VII admit construction of an arithmetical func-
tion A(x) such that:
(a) for any given natural number n, there is an algorithm that can
verify A(i) = f(i) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n (hence A(x) may be said to be
algorithmically verifiable if f(x) is recursive);
(b) there is no algorithm that can verify A(i) = f(i) for all 0 ≤ i (so
A(x) may be said to be algorithmically uncomputable)?
1.2.2 Defining effective computability
We shall then formally define what it means for a formula of an arithmetical
language to be:
(i) Algorithmically verifiable;
(ii) Algorithmically computable.
under an interpretation.
We shall further propose the definition:
Effective computability: A number-theoretic formula is effectively computable
if, and only if, it is algorithmically verifiable.
19See Section 1.1.
20[Go31], pp.30-31; reproduced below in Appendix A, Section 7.
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Intuitionistically unobjectionable: We note first that since every finite set
of integers is recursive, every well-defined number-theoretical formula is algo-
rithmically verifiable, and so the above definition is intuitionistically unobjec-
tionable; and second that the existence of an arithmetic formula that is algo-
rithmically verifiable but not algorithmically computable (Theorem 1) supports
Go¨del’s reservations on Alonzo Church’s original intention to label his Thesis as
a definition21 .
We shall then show that the algorithmically verifiable and the algorithmically
computable PA formulas are well-defined under the standard interpretation of
PA since:
(a) The PA-formulas are decidable as satisfied / unsatisfied or true
/ false under the standard interpretation of PA if, and only if, they
are algorithmically verifiable;
(b) The algorithmically computable PA-formulas are a proper subset
of the algorithmically verifiable PA-formulas;
(c) The PA-axioms are algorithmically computable as satisfied / true
under the standard interpretation of PA;
(d) Generalisation and Modus Ponens preserve algorithmically com-
putable truth under the standard interpretation of PA;
(e) The provable PA-formulas are precisely the ones that are algo-
rithmically computable as satisfied / true under the standard inter-
pretation of PA.
2 Comments, Notation and Standard Definitions
Comments We have taken some liberty in emphasising standard definitions
selectively, and interspersing our arguments liberally with comments and ref-
erences, generally of a foundational nature. These are intended to reflect our
underlying thesis that essentially arithmetical problems appear more natural
when expressed—and viewed—within the perspective of an interpretation of
PA that appeals to the evidence provided by a deterministic Turing machine22
along the lines suggested in Section 6; a perspective that, by its very nature,
cannot appeal implicitly to transfinite concepts.
Evidence “It is by now folklore . . . that one can view the values of a simple
functional language as specifying evidence for propositions in a constructive
logic . . . ”23.
Notation We use square brackets to indicate that the contents represent a
symbol or a formula—of a formal theory—generally assumed to be well-formed
unless otherwise indicated by the context.24 We use an asterisk to indicate that
21See Section 1.1.
22A deterministic Turing machine has only one possible move from a given configuration.
23[Mu91].
24In other words, expressions inside the square brackets are to be only viewed syntactically
as juxtaposition of symbols that are to be formed and manipulated upon strictly in accordance
with specific rules for such formation and manipulation—in the manner of a mechanical or
electronic device—without any regards to what the symbolism might represent semantically
under an interpretation that gives them meaning.
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the expression is to be interpreted semantically with respect to some well-defined
interpretation.
Definition 1 Aristotle’s particularisation This holds that from an asser-
tion such as:
‘It is not the case that: for any given x, P ∗(x) does not hold’,
usually denoted symbolically by ‘¬(∀x)¬P ∗(x)’, we may always validly infer in
the classical, Aristotlean, logic of predicates25 that:
‘There exists an unspecified x such that P ∗(x) holds’,
usually denoted symbolically by ‘(∃x)P ∗(x)’.
The significance of Aristotle’s particularisation for the first-order pred-
icate calculus: We note that in a formal language the formula ‘[(∃x)P (x)]’ is an
abbreviation for the formula ‘[¬(∀x)¬P (x)]’. The commonly accepted interpre-
tation of this formula—and a fundamental tenet of classical logic unrestrictedly
adopted as intuitively obvious by standard literature that seeks to build upon
the formal first-order predicate calculus26—tacitly appeals to Aristotlean par-
ticularisation.
However, L. E. J. Brouwer had noted in his seminal 1908 paper on the unreliabil-
ity of logical principles27 that the commonly accepted interpretation of this for-
mula is ambiguous if interpretation is intended over an infinite domain. He essen-
tially argued that, even supposing the formula ‘[P (x)]’ of a formal Arithmetical
language interprets as an arithmetical relation denoted by ‘P ∗(x)’, and the for-
mula ‘[¬(∀x)¬P (x)]’ as the arithmetical proposition denoted by ‘¬(∀x)¬P ∗(x)’,
the formula ‘[(∃x)P (x)]’ need not interpret as the arithmetical proposition de-
noted by the usual abbreviation ‘(∃x)P ∗(x)’; and that such postulation is invalid
as a general logical principle in the absence of a means for constructing some
putative object a for which the proposition P ∗(a) holds in the domain of the
interpretation.
Hence we shall follow the convention that the assumption that ‘(∃x)P ∗(x)’
is the intended interpretation of the formula ‘[(∃x)P (x)]’—which is essentially
the assumption that Aristotle’s particularisation holds over the domain of the
interpretation—must always be explicit.
The significance of Aristotle’s particularisation for PA: In order to avoid
intuitionistic objections to his reasoning, Go¨del introduced the syntactic prop-
erty of ω-consistency as an explicit assumption in his formal reasoning in his
seminal 1931 paper on formally undecidable arithmetical propositions28.
Go¨del explained at some length29 that his reasons for introducing ω-consistency
explicitly was to avoid appealing to the semantic concept of classical arithmetical
truth in Aristotle’s logic of predicates (which presumes Aristotle’s particularisa-
tion).
However, we note that the two concepts are meta-mathematically equivalent
in the sense that, if PA is consistent, then PA is ω-consistent if, and only if,
Aristotle’s particularisation holds under the standard interpretation of PA.
25[HA28], pp.58-59.
26See [Hi25], p.382; [HA28], p.48; [Sk28], p.515; [Go31], p.32.; [Kl52], p.169; [Ro53], p.90;
[BF58], p.46; [Be59], pp.178 & 218; [Su60], p.3; [Wa63], p.314-315; [Qu63], pp.12-13; [Kn63],
p.60; [Co66], p.4; [Me64], p.52(ii); [Nv64], p.92; [Li64], p.33; [Sh67], p.13; [Da82], p.xxv;
[Rg87], p.xvii; [EC89], p.174; [Mu91]; [Sm92], p.18, Ex.3; [BBJ03], p.102.
27[Br08].
28[Go31], p.23 and p.28.
29In his introduction on p.9 of [Go31].
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Definition 2 The structure N The structure of the natural numbers—namely,
{N (the set of natural numbers); = (equality); ′ (the successor function); + (the
addition function); ∗ (the product function); 0 (the null element)}.
Definition 3 The axioms of first-order Peano Arithmetic (PA)
PA1 [(x1 = x2)→ ((x1 = x3)→ (x2 = x3))];
PA2 [(x1 = x2)→ (x
′
1 = x
′
2)];
PA3 [0 6= x
′
1];
PA4 [(x
′
1 = x
′
2)→ (x1 = x2)];
PA5 [(x1 + 0) = x1];
PA6 [(x1 + x
′
2) = (x1 + x2)
′];
PA7 [(x1 ⋆ 0) = 0];
PA8 [(x1 ⋆ x
′
2) = ((x1 ⋆ x2) + x1)];
PA9 For any well-formed formula [F (x)] of PA:
[F (0)→ (((∀x)(F (x) → F (x′)))→ (∀x)F (x))].
Definition 4 Generalisation in PA If [A] is PA-provable, then so is [(∀x)A].
Definition 5 Modus Ponens in PA If [A] and [A → B] are PA-provable,
then so is [B].
Definition 6 Standard interpretation of PA The standard interpretation
of PA over the structure N is the one in which the logical constants have their
‘usual’ interpretations30 in Aristotle’s logic of predicates (which subsumes Aris-
totle’s particularisation), and31:
(a) the set of non-negative integers is the domain;
(b) the symbol [0] interprets as the integer 0;
(c) the symbol [′] interprets as the successor operation (addition of 1);
(d) the symbols [+] and [∗] interpret as ordinary addition and multiplication;
(e) the symbol [=] interprets as the identity relation.
3 Go¨del’s Theorem VII and algorithmically ver-
ifiable, but not algorithmically computable,
arithmetical propositions
In his seminal 1931 paper on formally undecidable arithmetical propositions,
Go¨del defined a curious primitive recursive function—Go¨del’s β-function—as32:
Definition 7 β(x1, x2, x3) = rm(1 + (x3 + 1) ⋆ x2, x1)
where rm(x1, x2) denotes the remainder obtained on dividing x2 by x1.
Go¨del showed that the above function has the remarkable property that:
Lemma 1 For any given denumerable sequence of natural numbers, say f(k, 0), f(k, 1), . . .,
and any given natural number n, we can construct natural numbers b, c, j such
that:
30See [Me64], p.49.
31See [Me64], p.107.
32cf. [Go31], p.31, Lemma 1; [Me64], p.131, Proposition 3.21.
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(i) j = max(n, f(k, 0), f(k, 1), . . . , f(k, n));
(ii) c = j!;
(iii) β(b, c, i) = f(k, i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof This is a standard result33. ✷
Go¨del’s original argument: We reproduce Go¨del’s original argument—which
yields this critical lemma—in Appendix A, Section 7.
Now we have the standard definition34:
Definition 8 A number-theoretic function f(x1, . . . , xn) is said to be repre-
sentable in PA if, and only if, there is a PA formula [F (x1, . . . , xn+1)] with the
free variables [x1, . . . , xn+1], such that, for any given natural numbers k1, . . . , kn+1:
(i) if f(k1, . . . , kn) = kn+1 then PA proves: [F (k1, . . . , kn, kn+1)];
(ii) PA proves: [(∃1xn+1)F (k1, . . . , kn, xn+1)].
The function f(x1, . . . , xn) is said to be strongly representable in PA if we
further have that:
(iii) PA proves: [(∃1xn+1)F (x1, . . . , xn, xn+1)]
Interpretation of ‘[∃1]’: The symbol ‘[∃1]’ denotes ‘uniqueness’ under an in-
terpretation which assumes that Aristotle’s particularisation holds in the domain
of the interpretation. Formally, however, the PA formula [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)]
is merely a short-hand notation for the PA formula [¬(∀x3)¬F (x1, x2, x3) ∧
(∀y)(∀z) (F (x1, x2, y) ∧ F (x1, x2, z)→ y = z)].
We then have:
Lemma 2 β(x1, x2, x3) is strongly represented in PA by [Bt(x1, x2, x3, x4)],
which is defined as follows:
[(∃w)(x1 = ((1+ (x3 +1) ⋆ x2) ⋆ w+ x4)∧ (x4 < 1+ (x3 +1) ⋆ x2))].
Proof This is a standard result35. ✷
Go¨del further showed (also under the tacit, but critical, presumption of
Aristotle’s particularisation36) that:
Lemma 3 If f(x1, x2) is a recursive function defined by:
(i) f(x1, 0) = g(x1)
(ii) f(x1, (x2 + 1)) = h(x1, x2, f(x1, x2))
33cf. [Go31], p.31, p.31, Lemma 1; [Me64], p.131, Proposition 3.22.
34[Me64], p.118.
35cf. [Me64], p.131, proposition 3.21.
36The implicit assumption being that the negation of a universally quantified formula of
the first-order predicate calculus is indicative of “the existence of a counter-example”—[Go31],
p.32.
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where g(x1) and h(x1, x2, x3) are recursive functions of lower rank
37 that are
represented in PA by well-formed formulas [G(x1, x2)] and [H(x1, x2, x3, x4)],
then f(x1, x2) is represented in PA by the following well-formed formula, denoted
by [F (x1, x2, x3)]:
[(∃u)(∃v)(((∃w)(Bt(u, v, 0, w)∧G(x1 , w)))∧Bt(u, v, x2, x3)∧(∀w)(w
< x2 → (∃y)(∃z)(Bt(u, v, w, y)∧Bt(u, v, (w+1), z)∧H(x1, w, y, z)))].
Proof This is a standard result38. ✷
Go¨del’s original argument: We reproduce Go¨del’s original argument and
proof of this critical lemma in Appendix A, Section 7.
3.1 What does “[(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)] is provable” assert under
the standard interpretation of PA?
Now, if the PA formula [F (x1, x2, x3)] represents in PA the recursive function
denoted by f(x1, x2) then by definition, for any given numerals [k], [m], the
formula [(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)] is provable in PA; and true under the standard
interpretation of PA. We thus have that:
Lemma 4 “[(∃1x3)F (k, m, x3)] is true under the standard interpretation of
PA” is the assertion that:
Given any natural numbers k,m, we can construct natural numbers
t(k,m), u(k,m), v(k,m)—all functions of k,m—such that:
(a) β(u(k,m), v(k,m), 0) = g(k);
(b) for all i < m, β(u(k,m), v(k,m), i) = h(k, i, f(k, i));
(c) β(u(k,m), v(k,m),m) = t(k,m);
where f(x1, x2), g(x1) and h(x1, x2, x3) are any recursive functions
that are formally represented in PA by F (x1, x2, x3), G(x1, x2) and
H(x1, x2, x3, x4) respectively such that:
(i) f(k, 0) = g(k)
(ii) f(k, (y + 1)) = h(k, y, f(k, y)) for all y < m
(iii) g(x1) and h(x1, x2, x3) are recursive functions that
are assumed to be of lower rank than f(x1, x2).
Proof For any given natural numbers k and m, if [F (x1, x2, x3)] interprets as a
well-defined arithmetical relation under the standard interpretation of PA, then
we can define a deterministic Turing machine TM that can ‘construct’ the se-
quences f(k, 0), f(k, 1), . . . , f(k,m) and β(u(k,m), v(k,m), 0), β(u(k,m), v(k,m), 1),
. . . , β(u(k,m), v(k,m),m) and give evidence to verify the assertion. ✷
37cf. [Me64], p.132; [Go31], p.30(2).
38cf. [Go31], p.31(2); [Me64], p.132.
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Does [F (x1, x2, x3] interpret as a well-defined predicate? A critical issue
that we do not address here is whether the PA formula [F (x1, x2, x3] can be
considered to interpret under a sound interpretation of PA as a well-defined
predicate, since the denumerable sequences {f(k, 0), f(k, 1), . . . , f(k,m), mp :
p > 0 and mp is not equal to mq if p is not equal to q}—are represented by
denumerable, distinctly different, functions β(up1 , vp2 , i) respectively. There are
thus denumerable pairs (up1 , vp2 ) for which β(up1 , vp2 , i) yields the sequence
f(k, 0), f(k, 1), . . . , f(k,m).
We now see that:
Theorem 1 Under the standard interpretation of PA [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] is
algorithmically verifiable, but not algorithmically computable, as always true
over N.
Proof It follows from Lemma 4 that:
(1) [(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)] is PA-provable for any given numerals [k,m].
Hence [(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)] is true under the standard interpretation
of PA. It then follows from the definition of [F (x1, x2, x3)] in Lemma
3 that, for any given natural numbers k,m, we can construct some
pair of natural numbers u(k,m), v(k,m)—where u(k,m), v(k,m) are func-
tions of the given natural numbers k and m—such that:
(a) β(u(k,m), v(k,m), i) = f(k, i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ m;
(b) F ∗(k,m, f(k,m)) holds in N.
Since β(x1, x2, x3) is primitive recursive, β(u(k,m), v(k,m), i) defines
a deterministic Turing machine TM that can ‘construct’ the denu-
merable sequence f ′(k, 0), f ′(k, 1), . . . for any given natural numbers
k and m such that:
(c) f(k, i) = f ′(k, i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ m.
We can thus define a deterministic Turing machine TM that will
give evidence that the PA formula [(∃1x3)F (k,m, x3)] is true under
the standard interpretation of PA.
Hence [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] is algorithmically verifiable over N under
the standard interpretation of PA.
(2) Now, the pair of natural numbers u(x1,x2), v(x1,x2) are defined
such that:
(a) β(u(x1,x2), v(x1,x2), i) = f(x1, i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ x2;
(b) F ∗(x1, x2, f(x1, x2)) holds in N;
where v(x1,x2) is defined in Lemma 3 as j!, and:
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(c) j = max(n, f(x1, 0), f(x1, 1), . . . , f(x1, x2));
(d) n is the ‘number’ of terms in the sequence f(x1, 0), f(x1, 1),
. . . , f(x1, x2).
Since j is not definable for a denumerable sequence β(u(x1,x2), v(x1,x2),
i) we cannot define a denumerable sequence f ′(x1, 0), f
′(x1, 1), . . .
such that:
(e) f(k, i) = f ′(k, i) for all i ≥ 0.
We cannot thus define a deterministic Turing machine TM that will
give evidence that the PA formula [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] interprets as
true under the standard interpretation of PA for any given sequence
of numerals [(a1, a2)].
Hence [(∃1x3)F (x1, x2, x3)] is not algorithmically computable over
N under the standard interpretation of PA.
The theorem follows. ✷
The above theorem now suggests the following definition:
Definition 9 Effective computability: A number-theoretic function is effec-
tively computable if, and only if, it is algorithmically verifiable.
However, we still need to formally define what it means for a number-
theoretic formula of an arithmetical language to be:
(i) Algorithmically verifiable;
(ii) Algorithmically computable.
under an interpretation.
4 Interpretation of an arithmetical language in
terms of Turing computability
We begin by noting that we can, in principle, define the classical ‘satisfaction’
and ‘truth’ of the formulas of a first order arithmetical language, such as PA,
verifiably under an interpretation using as evidence the computations of a simple
functional language.
Such definitions follow straightforwardly for the atomic formulas of the lan-
guage (i.e., those without the logical constants that correspond to ‘negation’,
‘conjunction’, ‘implication’ and ‘quantification’) from the standard definition of
a deterministic Turing machine39, based essentially on Alan Turing’s seminal
1936 paper on computable numbers40.
Moreover, it follows from Alfred Tarski’s seminal 1933 paper on the the con-
cept of truth in the languages of the deductive sciences41 that the ‘satisfaction’
39[Me64], pp.229-231.
40[Tu36].
41[Ta33].
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and ‘truth’ of those formulas of a first-order language which contain logical
constants can be inductively defined, under an interpretation, in terms of the
‘satisfaction’ and ‘truth’ of the interpretations of only the atomic formulas of
the language.
Hence the ‘satisfaction’ and ‘truth’ of those formulas (of an arithmetical lan-
guage) which contain logical constants can, in principle, also be defined verifiably
under an interpretation using as evidence the computations of a deterministic
Turing machine.
We show in Section 6 that this is indeed the case for PA under the standard
interpretation IPA(N, Standard), when this is explicitly defined as in Section 6.1.
We show in Section 6.2, moreover, that we can further define ‘algorithmic
truth’ and ‘algorithmic falsehood’ under IPA(N, Standard) such that the PA ax-
ioms interpret as always algorithmically true.
Significance of ‘algorithmic truth’: The algorithmically true propositions of
N under IPA(N, Standard) are thus a proper subset of the verifiably true propo-
sitions of N under IPA(N, Standard); and suggest a possible finitary ‘model’
42 of
PA that would establish the consistency of PA constructively.
4.1 The definitions of ‘algorithmic truth’ and ‘algorithmic
falsehood’ under IPA(N, Standard) are not symmetric with
respect to ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ under IPA(N, Standard)
However, the definitions (in Section 6.2) of ‘algorithmic truth’ and ‘algorithmic
falsehood’ under IPA(N, Standard) are not symmetric with respect to classical
(verifiable) ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ under IPA(N, Standard).
For instance, if a formula [F (x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of an arithmetic is algorithmi-
cally true under an interpretation (such as IPA(N, Standard)) that appeals to the
evidence provided by the computations of a deterministic Turing machine, then,
for any given denumerable sequence of numerical values [a1, a2, . . .], the formula
[F (a1, a2, . . . , an)] is also algorithmically true under the interpretation.
Denumerable sequence: We shall presume that any such sequence is ‘given’
in the sense of being defined by the ‘evidence’ of a deterministic Turing machine.
In other words, there is a deterministic Turing machine which can provide
evidence that the interpretation F ∗(a1, a2, . . . , an) of [F (a1, a2, . . . , an)] holds
in N for any given denumerable sequence of natural numbers (a1, a2, . . .).
Defining the term ‘hold’: We define the term ‘hold’—when used in con-
nection with an interpretation of a formal language and, more specifically, with
reference to the operations of a deterministic Turing machine associated with the
atomic formulas of the language—explicitly in Section 6; the aim being to avoid
appealing to the classically subjective (and existential) connotation implicitly
associated with the term under an implicitly defined standard interpretation of
an arithmetic43.
However, if a formula [F (x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of an arithmetic is algorithmically
false under an interpretation that appeals to the evidence provided by the com-
putations of a deterministic Turing machine, we cannot conclude that there is
42[Me64], p.51.
43As, for instance, in [Go31].
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a denumerable sequence of numerical values [a1, a2, . . .] such that the formula
[F (a1, a2, . . . , an)] is algorithmically false under the interpretation.
Reason: If a formula [F (x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of an arithmetic is algorithmically
false under such an interpretation, then we can only conclude that there is no
deterministic Turing machine which can provide evidence that the interpretation
F ∗(x1, x2, . . . , xn) holds in N for any given denumerable sequence of natural
numbers (a1, a2, . . .); we cannot conclude that there is a denumerable sequence
of natural numbers (b1, b2, . . .) such that F
∗(b1, b2, . . . , bn) does not hold in N.
Such a conclusion would require:
(i) either some additional evidence that will verify for some assignment of nu-
merical values to the free variables of [F ] that the corresponding interpretation
F ∗ does not hold44;
(ii) or the additional assumption that either Aristotle’s particularisation
holds over the domain of the interpretation (as is implicitly presumed under
the standard interpretation of PA) or the arithmetic is ω-consistent45.
An issue of consistency: An issue that we do not address here is whether
the assumption of Aristotle’s particularisation (or that of ω-completeness) is
consistent with the evidence provided by the computations of a deterministic
Turing machine for defining the satisfaction and truth of the formulas of an
arithmetic under an interpretation.
5 Defining algorithmic verifiability and algorith-
mic computability
The asymmetry of Section 4.1 suggests the following two concepts46:
Definition 10 Algorithmic verifiability: An arithmetical formula [F (x1, x2,
. . . , xn)] is algorithmically verifiable under an interpretation if, and only if, for
any given sequence of numerals [a1, a2, . . . , an], we can define a deterministic
Turing machine TM that computes [F (a1, a2, . . . , an)] and will halt on null
input if, and only if, [F (a1, a2, . . . , an)] interprets as either true or false under
the interpretation.
Interpretation of an arithmetical language verifiably in terms of Turing com-
putability Of course such a definition requires defining the ‘algorithmic verifiability’
of the formulas of an arithmetical language under an interpretation in terms of the op-
erations of a deterministic Turing machine. Such definitions follow straightforwardly
for the atomic formulas of the language (i.e., those without the logical constants that
correspond to ‘negation’, ‘conjunction’, ‘implication’ and ‘quantification’) from Alan
Turing’s seminal 1936 paper on computable numbers47. Moreover, it follows from
Alfred Tarski’s seminal 1933 paper on the the concept of truth in the languages of
the deductive sciences48 that the ‘algorithmic verifiability’ of the formulas of a for-
mal language which contain logical constants can be inductively defined under an
interpretation in terms of the ‘algorithmic verifiability’ of the interpretations of the
atomic formulas of the language. Hence the ‘algorithmic verifiability’ of the formulas
containing logical constants in the above definition can, in principle, be defined in
terms of the operations of a deterministic Turing machine. We show in Section 6 that
this is indeed the case.
44Essentially reflecting Brouwer’s objection to the assumption of Aristotle’s particularisation
over an infinite domain.
45An assumption explicitly introduced by Go¨del in [Go31].
46My thanks to Dr. Chaitanya H. Mehta for advising that the focus of this investigation
should be the distinction between these two concepts.
47[Tu36].
48[Ta33].
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Definition 11 Algorithmic computability: An arithmetical formula [F (x1,
x2, . . . , xn)] is algorithmically computable under an interpretation if, and only
if, we can define a deterministic Turing machine TM that computes [F (x1,
x2, . . . , xn)] and, for any given sequence of numerals [a1, a2, . . . , an], will halt
on [a1, a2, . . . , an] if, and only if, [F (a1, a2, . . . , an)] interprets as either true or
false under the interpretation.
Interpretation of an arithmetical language algorithmically in terms of Turing
computability We show in Section 6 that the ‘algorithmic computability’ of the
formulas of a formal language which contain logical constants can also be inductively
defined under an interpretation in terms of the ‘algorithmic computability’ of the
interpretations of the atomic formulas of the language.
We now show that the above concepts are well-defined under the standard
interpretation of PA.
6 Standard definitions of the ‘satisfiability’ and
‘truth’ of a formal language under an inter-
pretation
We note that standard interpretations of the formal reasoning and conclusions
of classical first order theory—based primarily on the work of Cantor, Go¨del,
Tarski, and Turing—seem to admit the impression that the classical, Tarskian,
truth (satisfiability) of the propositions of a formal mathematical language under
an interpretation is, both, non-algorithmic and essentially unverifiable construc-
tively49.
However—if mathematics is to serve as a universal set of languages of, both,
precise expression and unambiguous communication—such interpretations may
need to be balanced by an alternative, constructive and intuitionistically unob-
jectionable, interpretation—of classical foundational concepts—in which non-
algorithmic truth (satisfiability) is defined effectively50.
For instance, we note that—essentially following standard expositions51 of
Tarski’s inductive definitions on the ‘satisfiability’ and ‘truth’ of the formulas
of a formal language under an interpretation—we can define:
Definition 12 If [A] is an atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of a formal lan-
guage S, then the denumerable sequence (a1, a2, . . .) in the domain D of an
interpretation IS(D) of S satisfies [A] if, and only if:
(i) [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] interprets under IS(D) as a relation A
∗(x1, x2,
. . . , xn) in D for a witness WD of D;
(ii) there is a Satisfaction Method, SM(IS(D)) that provides objec-
tive evidence52 by which any witness WD of D can define for any
atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of S, and any given denumerable
sequence (b1, b2, . . .) of D, whether the proposition A
∗(b1, b2, . . . , bn)
holds or not in D;
49Thus giving rise to J. R. Lucas’ Go¨delian Argument in [Lu61]; but see also [An07a],
[An07b], [An07c] and [An08].
50Such an interpretation is broadly outlined in [An07d]
51cf. [Me64], p.51.
52In the sense of [Mu91].
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(iii) A∗(a1, a2, . . . , an) holds in D for WD.
Witness: From a constructive perspective, the existence of a ‘witness’ as in (i)
above is implicit in the usual expositions of Tarski’s definitions.
Satisfaction Method: From a constructive perspective, the existence of a
Satisfaction Method as in (ii) above is also implicit in the usual expositions of
Tarski’s definitions.
A constructive perspective: We highlight the word ‘define’ in (ii) above to
emphasise the constructive perspective underlying this paper; which is that the
concepts of ‘satisfaction’ and ‘truth’ under an interpretation are to be explicitly
viewed as objective assignments by a convention that is witness-independent.
A Platonist perspective would substitute ‘decide’ for ‘define’, thus implicitly
suggesting that these concepts can ‘exist’, in the sense of needing to be discovered
by some witness-dependent means—eerily akin to a ‘revelation’—even when the
domain D is N.
We can now inductively assign truth values of ‘satisfaction’, ‘truth’, and ‘fal-
sity’ to the compound formulas of a first-order theory S under the interpretation
IS(D) in terms of only the satisfiability of the atomic formulas of S over D as
follows53:
Definition 13 A denumerable sequence s of D satisfies [¬A] under IS(D) if,
and only if, s does not satisfy [A];
Definition 14 A denumerable sequence s of D satisfies [A → B] under IS(D)
if, and only if, either it is not the case that s satisfies [A], or s satisfies [B];
Definition 15 A denumerable sequence s of D satisfies [(∀xi)A] under IS(D)
if, and only if, given any denumerable sequence t of D which differs from s in
at most the i’th component, t satisfies [A];
Definition 16 A well-formed formula [A] of D is true under IS(D) if, and only
if, given any denumerable sequence t of D, t satisfies [A];
Definition 17 A well-formed formula [A] of D is false under under IS(D) if,
and only if, it is not the case that D is true under IS(D).
It follows that54:
Theorem 2 (Satisfaction Theorem) If, for any interpretation IS(D) of a first-
order theory S, there is a Satisfaction Method SM(IS(D)) which holds for a
witness WD of D, then:
(i) The ∆0 formulas of S are decidable as either true or false over
D under IS(D);
(ii) If the ∆n formulas of S are decidable as either true or as false
over D under IS(D), then so are the ∆(n+ 1) formulas of S.
53Compare [Me64], p.51; [Mu91].
54cf. [Me64], pp.51-53.
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Proof It follows from the above definitions that:
(a) If, for any given atomic formula [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of S, it is decidable
by WD whether or not a given denumerable sequence (a1, a2, . . .) of D satis-
fies [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] in D under IS(D) then, for any given compound formula
[A1(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of S containing any one of the logical constants ¬,→, ∀, it
is decidable by WD whether or not (a1, a2, . . .) satisfies [A
1(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] in D
under IS(D);
(b) If, for any given compound formula [Bn(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of S containing
n of the logical constants ¬,→, ∀, it is decidable by WD whether or not a given
denumerable sequence (a1, a2, . . .) of D satisfies [B
n(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] in D under
IS(D) then, for any given compound formula [B
(n+1)(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] of S con-
taining n+ 1 of the logical constants ¬,→, ∀, it is decidable by WD whether or
not (a1, a2, . . .) satisfies [B
(n+1)(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] in D under IS(D);
We thus have that:
(c) The ∆0 formulas of S are decidable by WD as either true or false over D
under IS(D);
(d) If the ∆n formulas of S are decidable by WD as either true or as false
over D under IS(D), then so are the ∆(n+ 1) formulas of S. ✷
In other words, if the atomic formulas of of S interpret under IS(D) as decid-
able with respect to the Satisfaction Method SM(IS(D)) by a witness WD over
some domain D, then the propositions of S (i.e., the Πn and Σn formulas of S)
also interpret as decidable with respect to SM(IS(D)) by the witness WD over
D.
6.1 An explicit definition of the standard interpretation
of PA
We now consider the application of Tarski’s definitions to the standard inter-
pretation IPA(N, Standard) of PA where:
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as
the underlying logic;
(b) we define D as N;
(c) we take SM(IPA(N, Standard)) as a deterministic Turing machine.
We note that:
Theorem 3 The atomic formulas of PA are algorithmically verifiable under the
standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard).
Proof If [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is an atomic formula of PA then, for any given
denumerable sequence of numerals [b1, b2, . . .], the PA formula [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)]
is an atomic formula of the form [c = d], where [c] and [d] are atomic PA formulas
that denote PA numerals. Since [c] and [d] are recursively defined formulas in
the language of PA, it follows from a standard result55 that, if PA is consistent,
55For any natural numbers m, n, if m 6= n, then PA proves [¬(m = n)] ([Me64], p.110,
Proposition 3.6). The converse is obviously true.
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then [c = d] interprets as the proposition c = d which either holds or not for a
witness WN in N.
Hence, if PA is consistent, then [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is algorithmically verifi-
able since, for any given denumerable sequence of numerals [b1, b2, . . .], we can
define a deterministic Turing machine TM that will compute [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)]
and halt on null input as evidence that the PA formula [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] is
decidable under the interpretation.
The theorem follows. ✷
We thus have that:
Corollary 1 The ‘satisfaction’ and ‘truth’ of PA formulas containing logical
constants can be defined under the standard interpretation of PA in terms of the
evidence provided by the computations of a deterministic Turing machine.
6.2 Defining ‘algorithmic truth’ under the standard inter-
pretation of PA and interpreting the PA axioms
Now we note that, in addition to Theorem 3:
Theorem 4 The atomic formulas of PA are algorithmically computable under
the standard interpretation IPA(N, Standard).
Proof If [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] is an atomic formula of PA then we can define
a deterministic Turing machine TM that will compute [A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)] and
halt on any given denumerable sequence of numerals [b1, b2, . . .] as evidence that
the PA formula [A(b1, b2, . . . , bn)] is decidable under the interpretation.
The theorem follows. ✷
This suggests the following definitions:
Definition 18 A well-formed formula [A] of PA is algorithmically true under
IPA(N, Standard) if, and only if, there is a deterministic Turing machine which
computes [A] and provides evidence that, given any denumerable sequence t of
N, t satisfies [A];
Definition 19 A well-formed formula [A] of PA is algorithmically false under
under IPA(N) if, and only if, it is not algorithmically true under IPA(N).
The significance of defining ‘algorithmic truth’ under IPA(N, Standard) as
above is that:
Lemma 5 The PA axioms PA1 to PA8 are algorithmically computable as algo-
rithmically true over N under the interpretation IPA(N, Standard).
Proof Since [x + y], [x ⋆ y], [x = y], [x′] are defined recursively56, the PA
axioms PA1 to PA8 interpret as recursive relations that do not involve any
quantification. The lemma follows straightforwardly from Definitions 12 to 17
in Section 6 and Theorem 3. ✷
56cf. [Go31], p.17.
17
Lemma 6 For any given PA formula [F (x)], the Induction axiom schema [F (0)
→ (((∀x)(F (x) → F (x′)))→ (∀x)F (x))] interprets as algorithmically true under
IPA(N, Standard).
Proof By Definitions 12 to 19:
(a) If [F (0)] interprets as algorithmically false under IPA(N, Standard)
the lemma is proved.
Since [F (0) → (((∀x)(F (x) → F (x′))) → (∀x)F (x))] interprets as
algorithmically true if, and only if, either [F (0)] interprets as algo-
rithmically false or [((∀x)(F (x) → F (x′))) → (∀x)F (x)] interprets
as algorithmically true.
(b) If [F (0)] interprets as algorithmically true and [(∀x)(F (x) →
F (x′))] interprets as algorithmically false under IPA(N, Standard), the
lemma is proved.
(c) If [F (0)] and [(∀x)(F (x) → F (x′))] both interpret as algorith-
mically true under IPA(N, Standard), then by Definition 18 there is
a deterministic Turing machine TM that, for any natural number
n, will give evidence that the formula [F (n)→ F (n′)] is true under
IPA(N, Standard).
Since [F (0)] interprets as algorithmically true under IPA(N, Standard),
it follows that there is a deterministic Turing machine TM that, for
any natural number n, will give evidence that the formula [F (n)] is
true under the interpretation.
Hence [(∀x)F (x)] is algorithmically true under IPA(N, Standard).
Since the above cases are exhaustive, the lemma follows. ✷
The Poincare´-Hilbert debate: We note that Lemma 6 appears to settle
the Poincare´-Hilbert debate57 in the latter’s favour. Poincare´ believed that the
Induction Axiom could not be justified finitarily, as any such argument would
necessarily need to appeal to infinite induction. Hilbert believed that a finitary
proof of the consistency of PA was possible.
Lemma 7 Generalisation preserves algorithmic truth under IPA(N, Standard).
Proof The two meta-assertions:
‘[F (x)] interprets as algorithmically true under IPA(N, Standard)
58’
and
‘[(∀x)F (x)] interprets as algorithmically true under IPA(N, Standard)’
both mean:
[F (x)] is algorithmically computable as always true under IPA(N),
Standard). ✷
57See [Hi27], p.472; also [Br13], p.59; [We27], p.482; [Pa71], p.502-503.
58See Definition 16
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It is also straightforward to see that:
Lemma 8 Modus Ponens preserves algorithmic truth under IPA(N, Standard).
✷
We thus have that:
Theorem 5 The axioms of PA are always algorithmically true under the inter-
pretation IPA(N, Standard), and the rules of inference of PA preserve the proper-
ties of algorithmic satisfaction/truth under IPA(N, Standard), without appeal to
Aristotle’s particularisation. ✷
7 Appendix A: Go¨del’s Theorem VII(2)
(Excerpted from [Go31] pp.29-31.)
Every relation of the form x0 = φ(x1, . . . , xn), where φ is recursive, is arith-
metical and we apply complete induction on the rank of φ. Let φ have rank
s(s > 1). . . .
φ(0, x2, . . . , xn) = ψ(x2, . . . , xn)
φ(k + 1, x2, . . . , xn) = µ[k, φ(k, x2, . . . , xn), x2, . . . , xn]
(where ψ, µ have lower rank than s).
. . . we apply the following procedure: one can express the relation x0 =
φ(x1, . . . , xn) with the help of the concept “sequence of numbers” (f)
59 in the
following manner:
x0 = φ(x1, . . . , xn) ∼ (∃f){f0 = ψ(x2, . . . , xn) & (∀k)(k < x1 →
fk+1 = µ(k, fk, x2, . . . , xn) & x0 = fx1}
If S(y, x2, . . . , xn), T (z, x1, . . . , xn+1) are the arithmetical relations
which, according to the inductive hypothesis, are equivalent to y = ψ(x2,
. . . , xn), and z = µ(x1, . . . , xn+1) respectively, then we have:
x0 = φ(x1, . . . , xn) ∼ (∃f){S(f0, x2, . . . , xn) & (∀k)[k < x1 →
T (fk+1, k, x2, . . . , xn)] & x0 = fx1} (17)
Now we replace the concept “sequence of numbers” by “pairs of numbers” by
correlating with the number pair n, d the sequence of numbers f (n,d) (f
(n,d)
k =
[n]1+(k+1)d, where [n]p denotes the smallest non-negative remainder of nmodulo
p).
Then:
Lemma 1: If f is an arbitrary sequence of natural numbers and k is an
arbitrary natural number, then there exists a pair of natural numbers n, d such
that f (n,d) and f coincide in their first k terms.
Proof: Let l be the greatest of the numbers k, f0, f1, . . . , fk−1. Determine n
so that
59f denotes here a variable whose domain is the sequence of natural numbers. The (k+1)st
term of a sequence f is designated fk (and the first, f0).
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n ≡ fi [mod (1 + (i + 1)l!)] for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1,
which is possible, since any two of the numbers 1 + (i+1)l! (i = 0, 1, . . . , k− 1)
are relatively prime. For, a prime dividing two of these numbers must also
divide the difference (i1 − i2)l! and therefore, since i1 − i2 < l, must also divide
l!, which is impossible. The number pair n, l! fulfills our requirement.
Since the relation x = [n]p is defined by
x ≡ n (mod p) & x < p
and is therefore arithmetical, then so also is the relation P (x0, x1, . . . , xn) de-
fined as follows:
P (x0, x1, . . . , xn) ≡ (∃n, d){S([n]d+1, x2, . . . , xn) & (∀k)[k < x1 →
T ([n]1+d (k+2), k, [n]1+d(k+1), x2, . . . , xn)] & x0 = [n]1+d(x1+1)}
which, according to (17) and Lemma 1, is equivalent to x0 = φ(x1, . . . , xn) (in
the sequence f in (17) only its values up to the (x + 1)th term matter). Thus,
Theorem VII(2) is proved.
Comment: Go¨del’s remark that “in the sequence f in (17) only its values up
to the (x + 1)th term matter” is significant. The proof of Theorem 1 depends
upon the fact that the equivalence between f(n,d) and f cannot be extended
non-terminatingly.
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